27 de junio de 2012

"Five Forces" by Michael Eugene Porter



Force 1: Barriers to entry

Barriers to entry measure how easy or difficult it is for new entrants to enter into the industry. This can involve for example:
  • Cost advantages (economies of scale, economies of scope)
  • Access to production inputs and financing,
  • Government policies and taxation
  • Production cycle and learning curve
  • Capital requirements
  • Access to distribution channels
Patents, branding, and image also fall into this category.


Force 2: Threat of substitutes

Every top decision makes has to ask: How easy can our product or service be substituted? The following needs to be analyzed:
  • How much does it cost the customer to switch to competing products or services?
  • How likely are customers to switch?
  • What is the price-performance trade-off of substitutes?
If a product can be easily substituted, then it is a threat to the company because it can compete with price only.


Force 3: Bargaining power of buyers

Now the question is how strong the position of buyers is. For example, can your customers work together to order large volumes to squeeze your profit margins? The following is a list of other examples:
  • Buyer volume and concentration
  • What information buyers have
  • Can buyers corner you in negotiations about price
  • How loyal are customers to your brand
  • Price sensitivity
  • Threat of backward integration
  • How well differentiated your product is
  • Availability of substitutes
Having a customer that has the leverage to dictate your prices is not a good position. 


Force 4: Bargaining power of suppliers

This relates to what your suppliers can do in relationship with you.
  • How strong is the position of sellers?
  • Are there many or only few potential suppliers?
  • Is there a monopoly?
  • Do you take inputs from a single supplier or from a group? (concentration)
  • How much do you take from each of your suppliers?
  • Can you easily switch from one supplier to another one? (switching costs)
  • If you switch to another supplier, will it affect the cost and differentiation of your product?
  • Are there other suppliers with the same inputs available? (substitute inputs)
The threat of forward integration is also an important factor here. 


Force 5: Rivalry among the existing players

Finally, we have to analyze the level of competition between existing players in the industry.
  • Is one player very dominant or all equal in strength/size?
  • Are there exit barriers?
  • How fast does the industry grow?
  • Does the industry operate at surplus or shortage?
  • How is the industry concentrated?
  • How do customers identify themselves with your brand?
  • Is the product differentiated?
  • How well are rivals diversified?
Rivalry is the fifth factor in the Five Forces model but probably the one with the most attention.

26 de junio de 2012

Microeconomía del Arte y la pintura

Ruskin1, criticando a Mill, afirmó que donde la investigación es necesaria, la enseñanza es imposible. Desde luego, no creo que esta aseveración sea acertada, especialmente en las Ciencias Económicas, pero sí me atrevería a parafrasearla diciendo que donde la investigación es necesaria, la compilación es útil.
 
Hay que señalar además, que aunque quisiera que este trabajo prefigurase mi tesis doctoral, o al menos, su ámbito de estudio, he intentado no confundir ambas cosas, pues se halla necesariamente limitado por su naturaleza como Proyecto Fin de Carrera. Se trata de un tipo de trabajo sin mucha tradición en las Facultades de Economía españolas, que los nuevos planes de estudio brindan ahora, como un medio de conseguir los créditos complementarios necesarios para obtener la Licenciatura, a los alumnos que pretendemos orientarnos profesionalmente hacia el mundo académico e investigador.
 
Por todo ello, los objetivos de este trabajo, son necesariamente modestos. Durante los últimos veinticinco años, el análisis del mercado del arte, y especialmente de la pintura, ha producido una interesante literatura, que poco a poco ha ido germinando hasta convertirse en una rama del análisis económico: La Economía del Arte. Lo que nos proponemos es una aproximación a los problemas surgidos y las soluciones aportadas a lo largo de este proceso.


David de Ugarte
Ver PDF

25 de junio de 2012

Howard Marks: "You Can't Predict. You Can Prepare"

Those who have been readers of my memos for any meaningful period of time know there are a few things I dismiss and a few I believe in thoroughly. The former include economic forecasts, which I think don't add value, and the list of the latter starts with cycles and the need to prepare for them.
 
"Hey," you might say, "that's contradictory. The best way to prepare for cycles is to predict them, and you just said it can't be done." That's absolutely true, but in my opinion by no means debilitating. All of investing consists of dealing with the future, as I've written before, and the future is something we can't know much about. But the limits on our foreknowledge needn't doom us to failure as long as we acknowledge them and act accordingly.
 
In my opinion, the key to dealing with the future lies in knowing where you are, even if you can't know precisely where you're going. Knowing where you are in a cycle and what that implies for the future is very different from predicting the timing, extent and shape of the next cyclical move. And so we'd better understand all we can about cycles and their behavior.

Howard Marks
Chairman of Oaktree Capital Management, L.P

19 de junio de 2012

Spain in figures 2012

Cover of the publication 
The aim of this general, informative publication is to provide an updated panorama of the most relevant demographic, social and economic aspects of our country and its surrounding environment, providing data from both the INE and other statistical sources. With this purpose, its different chapters collect data taken from the Instituto itself, as well as from other official statistical sources, national or international.


18 de junio de 2012

"Principles of economics" by Carl Menger

This online version of Carl Menger’s Principlesof Economics containscorrections to the 1976 New York University edition; the manuscript is otherwise the same. First printing in German, 1871.

15 de junio de 2012

The way forward: The values of Sonae

Paulo Alexandrino Photographer


Woody Allen said he is only interested in immortality if he doesn’t die; he is not interest in achieving immortality through the memory of his work.
 
Organizations can also aspire to this. Immortality is possible if permanent care and renewal is provided to them; without this, organizations inexorably fade.
 
In fact, companies usually do not live as long as individuals, but it is true that companies that have a strong family foundation and support tend to last longer than the others. It is probably a subject to be dealt with by academics but I suspect that sharing a solid set of family-originated values and beliefs – which end up shaping strategy-planning within a context of shareholding stability - might not be totally absent from a thorough explanation for long-living companies.
 
Values are immaterial, but lasting; they are intangible, but firm like pillars. Values are the source of nourishment to an organization and to a company and Sonae is no exception. A strong set of values is the matrix according to which the evolution of Sonae Group should be read and interpreted. This does not mean that values are immune to change – only change itself is and should be immune to change. It simply means that the axiology matrix is fundamentally the same, irrespective of all the changes - also to the values – that come with time and with the dynamics of society and life.
 
Sonae was founded in 1959 as a company that introduced the production of a wood based product called “estratifite” in Portugal, using a waste product – grape stems. I arrived at the company in 1965 to perform an operation and a transformational change at the same time:to discover the purpose of Sonae, what future it had. And I loved that because it was a case of applying one of the principles of the economist Joseph Schumpeter, who believed it possible to destroy and be creative at the same time. My first tasks as a young engineer were to have to send half the equipment to the scrap yard and to change the people who were here. For a long time I worked 24 or 48 or 72 hours non-stop in order to ensure the complete transformation. We opened the first hypermarket (Continente) in Portugal in 1985 and by the late 1980’s we became (and we still are today) the largest non-financial Portuguese group and the biggest employer in Portugal, that aspired to leadership in business areas as diverse as Industry, Retail, Communication and Information Technologies or Tourism (our turnover for 1989 was 530 m€). In the meantime, we spinned-off the tourism and industry segments, that are currently owned by Sonae Capital and Sonae Indústria (sister companies under EFANOR holding – see chart below), and we are focused in retail – food, electronics, sports and fashion - as our core business. We have two core partnerships at the shopping centres and telecoms businesses, an independent business unit focused on the management of the retail real estate assets, and an investment management area that is committed to creating value through M&A. Our turnover for 2010 (including Sonae Capital and Sonae Indústria) was 7,386 m€ and we are present in 41 countries with over 49,000 employees.

Of course, Sonae values are not today exactly the same as they were in the past; there was a slow but steady evolution that was brought by time, people, experience and knowledge and I am strongly convinced that they are getting better, more sophisticated and more comprehensive albeit the matrix has not changed in the sense that an individual’s DNA does not change with aging.
 
I never emphasize the distinction between family and corporate values: they are essentially the same, although natural differences exist regarding circumstances and contexts. What I mean is that I don’t see as intellectually and morally justifiable upholding certain values in one’s private and familiar life and a totally different set of values in one’s public or corporate life. I never understood such a way of one positioning oneself in life and I am convinced that this is one of the causes for the lack of credibility of many politicians and leaders in general. There is no true leadership, as I understand it, without credibility, authenticity and honesty and I think these will come along naturally when you don’t raise fundamental barriers between your private, corporate and citizenship lives. I also never had too much respect for hierarchies and powers-that-be and always preferred to look closely at substance irrespective of the formality; this is, I believe, a necessary condition for innovation to flourish and for leadership to be credible and self-imposing with natural authority.
 
I am lucky to have been able to build a family where friendship, mutual help and understanding are bonds that bring unity, stability and harmony regarding long-terms commitment with the family and with Sonae. In fact, family and professional scopes end up mixing and almost confusing with each other because everyone shares the same view point regarding Sonae; this is one that understands companies as long-living, sustainable entities and therefore despises short-term perspectives built on strict shareholders’ remuneration demands or opportunistic share-dealings, as these tend to hinder companies’ reputation and investment, thereby compromising the possibilities of long-term economic success of undertakings, and bring with it unemployment, damage to the community and also economic instability to the family members.
 
Also, we have always had a clear vision of a long-lasting company as that where the distinction between ownership and management is vital. Despite family control of the majority of Sonae’s share capital, we are very determined in ensuring a strictly professional, merit-based management and governance systems, where leading positions are reached by those who have the necessary skills to get there and no one cares about family names. We are now considering that in today’s world we might joint-venture with other partners defending the same or similar values, thereby enabling us to establish partnerships where we do not have a controlling position, as long as we set out beforehand exit clauses that allow for a swift, smooth and non-destructive parting of ways.
 
There is of course a genetic factor in all of this that cannot be disregarded, but the most important is that our family values – that are also put into action and truly lived in Sonae – are deeply rooted in, cherished and accepted by us and we also expect the Sonae values to be understood, adhered to and put in place by each and every one of the circa 43,000 employees of the Sonae Group. Living the values – walking the talk -, that is really what sets the difference between our set of values as the key-elements of a given culture that merges, federates and transcends the number of cultures, beliefs and values of many individuals and also marks the tone and the pace for behaviors and builds the identity of an organization, on one hand, and mere wishful thinking, on the other hand, although there is a non-neglectable component of idealism present when certain expected behaviors, stances, convictions, principles and actions are deemed as ideal or desirable.
 
Constantly walking the path of information-seeking, permanent learning and training and risk-taking action, the Sonae values were always – they still are – based upon three fundamental pillars I could refer to as Probity (this being an intimate and honest attitude of integrity and loyalty towards everyone in life), Permanent Dissatisfaction (this is a more work-oriented and entrepreneurship feature) and Leading by example (the action-driven personality that is resolved to showing others that we do as we preach).
 
One could say that my personal and family life is therefore juxtaposed to the one I lead as Sonae’s Chairman and it obeys to the same set of values as the organization does. I will now briefly describe them, as they are expressed today: 
  • (i) trust and integrity – creating value in the long term built on relationships that are founded on integrity and trust; 
  • (ii) people at the centre of our success – we are constantly setting challenges and open to change, which is crucial to attract ambitious people, that are a determining factor in all the markets where we operate (this is why we invest in developing their capabilities and skills); 
  • (iii) ambition – this is born from continuously establishing goals that stretch us to our limits, stimulate our energy and reinforce our determination and it drives us and keeps us dissatisfied with the status quo and forces us to beyond our past successes; 
  • (iv) innovation – this is at the heart of our businesses and it involves risks but we are aware of the importance of identifying and managing these risks so as to maintain them within reasonable limits (only by innovating is possible to grow sustainably); 
  • (v) social responsibility – we have an active sense of social responsibility, we try to contribute to improving the communities within which we operate and our behavior takes into account the most recent environmental concerns and sustainable development policies; 
  • (vi) frugality and efficiency – we aim to optimize the use of resources and maximize their return, seeking cost efficiency, avoiding any waste or extravagance and, as a priority, we focus on achieving operation efficiency, promoting healthy competition and delivering high impact projects; 
  • (vii) cooperation and independence – we are willing andready to cooperate with central and local governments in order to improve regulatory, legal and social frameworks and to ensure the best solutions for the communities where we operate, but we also take care to maintain our independence in relation to all such entities.

This particular set of values has influenced decisively Sonae’s work ethics and the way of doing things: we work with excellence, curiosity, frankness, clarity, creativity and merit, by being customer-focused, communicating, with boldness, sense of ownership and common sense. What is essential is to be always open-minded, to listen, to ask intelligent questions, to always assume that anything can be done, because those who content themselves with always doing more or less the same thing are moving backwards, as the world only advances through innovation. This is indeed the ‘immaterial cement’ that binds the group together, and takes it beyond the rigidity of organization charts and the classic synergies of operational efficiency.

If one adds all these elements to the strong leadership from Sonae’s managers and the richness and diversity of all the teams, one gets a fairly precise picture of what Sonae is today and intends to be tomorrow.

We call it our way and this is in fact my way, my family’s way and of course Efanor’s and Sonae’s way, which reflects our very strong rejection of the idea of capitalism as a system that aims at creating material richness for a few and does not have to worry about being intelligent, sustainable or responsible regarding the community, the environment and employees, nor should contributing to reduce social imbalances be one of its concerns.
 
We aim at giving importance to what really is important and shortterm, speculative gains are not compatible with our line of thinking in the family and at Sonae. In this sense, I am very much identified with the idea of Schumpeter regarding the role of entrepreneurs and businessmen as agents of change and innovation in society that create value. I have always viewed my own role as an entrepreneur as that of a curator of wealth that should be invested to generate more wealth and create more jobs; by the way, that is also what I really like to do.

Despite all this, Sonae is far from being immune to these difficult times and to the effects of the financial and economic crisis that is still storming across Portugal, Europe and a big part of the world, but I remain very confident that our way and our values are the right ones and neither I, my family nor Sonae will move away from these. Solidness and resilience of values should be tested and proven under difficult conditions.

We at Sonae understood that immaterial synergies are fundamental and it is with great joy that I am making this statement about the importance of values in organizations – this is clearer today than ever – simultaneously with fado being considered Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity by UNESCO.

My simple conclusion is this: key-words are education, culture and ethics. These, like fado, are easily validated in any part of the world and they give me all the necessary confidence to be sure about our future success as an international, growing, long-living company.


Belmiro de Azevedo, Chairman SONAE Group
Universia Business Review

13 de junio de 2012

La Fageda, història d'una bogeria.


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12 de junio de 2012

Case method: Mrs B's Story.

An American legend, Rose Blumkin (Mrs. B), knew early in life that honesty and integrity would serve her well. Those beliefs laid the foundation for Nebraska Furniture Mart's rise to its status as a Midwestern retailing legend.

Born outside of Minsk, Russia, in 1893, Rose Gorelick followed her husband, Isadore Blumkin to America in 1917 to take on the American dream. By 1922, the young couple had scraped together enough money to have her family flee Russia and join them in America.

In addition to raising their four children, Mrs. B helped with her husband's business ventures, including a second-hand clothing shop. Finding deals on men's suits and accessories, she printed 10,000 circulars that offered to outfit a man from head to toe for five dollars - an amazingly fair deal for the times. It worked nicely, and she made a respectable profit.

In 1937, the Nebraska Furniture Mart was founded in the basement of her husband's shop. Her belief in selling at tiny margins created rough going early on with the manufacturers boycotting Mrs. B at the urging of local competition, who generally operated on higher markups. Traveling by train to Kansas City, Chicago and New York, she became a proficient furniture bargain hunter by buying from large furniture stores at 5% over their cost, and still making a profit using her low markup sales strategy.

Still, battling reluctant suppliers and a depressed Korean War economy in 1951, Mrs. B filled Omaha's City Auditorium with the store's inventory for an all-out, three-day sale. In three chaotic days, she took in $250,000 and eliminated her debt forever.

The growing success led to moves to various downtown locations, and the flagship store at 2205 Farnam eventually expanded to 120,000 square feet and operated in tandem with the present 72nd street location from 1970 to 1980. Joining his mother in the business in post-war 1946, son Louie contributed immeasurably to the growth and success of the business.

A devastating tornado in 1975 caused only a minor blip on the business record of the business. With millions of dollars in damage to the 72nd street store, Mrs. B and her son simply rebuilt bigger and better.
  
Impressed with the success, business savvy and honest dealings of the Blumkins, investor Warren Buffett and Mrs. B used a simple handshake to seal the purchase of 90% of the business for Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway portfolio in 1983. The 'Historic Omaha Handshake' plus a simple two-page written agreement were all that were required - no audit of the store's books, no inventory of its merchandise.

Daily dealings with her customers over the years, long work days and later in life, her motorized cart buzzing around her store, she was always bringing a smile to a customer's face with a great deal.

Throughout the years Mrs. B supported many causes and various community events, many times behind the scenes. The most notable is the Rose Blumkin Jewish Home and the renovation of the Astro theater into 'The Rose', - the Rose Blumkin Performing Arts Center - the home of the Emmy Gifford Children's Theater.

Until her death in 1998 at 104, Rose Blumkin rode the crest of a simple business tenet: "Sell cheap and tell the truth." The store, now under the leadership of her son Louie, and three grandsons, still adheres to this advice as Mrs. B's philosophy continues to help them meet each new challenge.


8 de junio de 2012

Nothing to fear but fear itself?

The yields on safe haven government bonds fell to a record low at the end of May. Nominal 2-year interest rates on Swiss and German sovereign debt are currently negative – people pay for the right to lend money to these governments. 10-year interest rates on bonds issued in these countries and in the US and UK are all below the expected rate of inflation over the next 10 years. Hence creditors expect to get back less in real terms than the amount they have lent their governments.

This is a symptom of extreme anxiety about the economic outlook. While dampened growth in Q1 in China, India and some other emerging markets, and generally somewhat lower activity indicators for the industrial sectors in both advanced and emerging economies, may go some way to explaining this pessimism, the main thing weighing on investors' minds is the outlook for the eurozone.

The upcoming parliamentary election in Greece has led a lot of investors to conclude that a Greek exit from the eurozone is a given. To some extent the market is also pricing in the likelihood of a complete breakdown of the eurozone, with all 17 member states reintroducing their own currencies. And that would be a calamity not just for Europe, but for the global economy as a whole.

Given that the stakes are so high, however, we think that only severe political mishandling would lead to a break-up of the eurozone. In fact, since the risk of contagion is real, we believe that Greece too will remain a member of the eurozone. Note that the electorate in Greece supports the euro by a huge majority. What Athens probably will demand, irrespective of who wins the June 17 election, is a renegotiation of the austerity package that the EU and the IMF has imposed on Greece. And we expect them to get it.

In the event of a "Grexit", we expect the ECB, the EU and the IMF to use all the ammunition they can muster in order to contain the crisis. If politicians hesitate, we expect the ECB to launch massive new rounds of long-term cheap financing of the European banking system. In addition we expect the ECB to de facto transform the monetary union into a fiscal union, by purchasing unlimited amounts of peripheral sovereign debt at certain guaranteed interest spreads relative to Germany. The ECB technocrats cannot do this without being given the green light by politicians. But we expect them to get the go-ahead, and for the politicians to then explain to their electorates and to try legally implement a fiscal union ex post.

The Economy at a Glance is a macroeconomic update by Torgeir Høien.


Skagen Fondene


6 de junio de 2012

Warren Buffett: "After we buy a stock, consequently, we would not be disturbed if markets closed for a year or two"


Academics, however, like to define investment "risk" differently, averring that it is the relative volatility of a stock or portfolio of stocks - that is, their volatility as compared to that of a large universe of stocks.  Employing data bases and statistical skills, these academics compute with precision the "beta" of a stock - its relative volatility in the past - and then build arcane investment and capital-allocation theories around this calculation.  In their hunger for a single statistic to measure risk, however, they forget a fundamental principle:  It is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong.

For owners of a business - and that's the way we think of shareholders - the academics' definition of risk is far off the mark, so much so that it produces absurdities.  For example, under beta-based theory, a stock that has dropped very sharply compared to the market - as had Washington Post when we bought it in 1973 - becomes "riskier" at the lower price than it was at the higher price.  Would that description have then made any sense to someone who was offered the entire company at a vastly-reduced price?

In fact, the true investor welcomes volatility.  Ben Graham explained why in Chapter 8 of The Intelligent Investor.  There he introduced "Mr. Market," an obliging fellow who shows up every day to either buy from you or sell to you, whichever you wish.  The more manic-depressive this chap is, the greater the opportunities available to the investor.  That's true because a wildly fluctuating market means that irrationally low prices will periodically be attached to solid businesses.  It is impossible to see how the availability of such prices can be thought of as increasing the hazards for an investor who is totally free to either ignore the market or exploit its folly.

In assessing risk, a beta purist will disdain examining what a company produces, what its competitors are doing, or how much borrowed money the business employs.  He may even prefer not to know the company's name.  What he treasures is the price history of its stock.  In contrast, we'll happily forgo knowing the price history and instead will seek whatever information will further our understanding of the company's business.  After we buy a stock, consequently, we would not be disturbed if markets closed for a year or two.  We don't need a daily quote on our 100% position in See's or H. H. Brown to validate our well-being.  Why, then, should we need a quote on our 7% interest in Coke?

In our opinion, the real risk that an investor must assess is whether his aggregate after-tax receipts from an investment (including those he receives on sale) will, over his prospective holding period, give him at least as much purchasing power as he had to begin with, plus a modest rate of interest on that initial stake.  Though this risk cannot be calculated with engineering precision, it can in some cases be judged with a degree of accuracy that is useful.  The primary factors bearing upon this evaluation are:

1) The certainty with which the long-term economic characteristics of the business can be evaluated;

2) The certainty with which management can be evaluated, both as to its ability to realize the full potential of the business and to wisely employ its cash flows;

3) The certainty with which management can be counted on to channel the rewards from the business to the shareholders rather than to itself;

4) The purchase price of the business;

5) The levels of taxation and inflation that will be experienced and that will determine the degree by which an investor's purchasing-power return is reduced from his gross return.

These factors will probably strike many analysts as unbearably fuzzy, since they cannot be extracted from a data base of any kind. But the difficulty of precisely quantifying these matters does not negate their importance nor is it insuperable.  Just as Justice Stewart found it impossible to formulate a test for obscenity but nevertheless asserted, "I know it when I see it," so also can investors - in an inexact but useful way - "see" the risks inherent in certain investments without reference to complex equations or price histories.

Is it really so difficult to conclude that Coca-Cola and Gillette possess far less business risk over the long term than, say, any computer company or retailer?  Worldwide, Coke sells about 44% of all soft drinks, and Gillette has more than a 60% share (in value) of the blade market.  Leaving aside chewing gum, in which Wrigley is dominant, I know of no other significant businesses in which the leading company has long enjoyed such global power.

Moreover, both Coke and Gillette have actually increased their worldwide shares of market in recent years.  The might of their brand names, the attributes of their products, and the strength of their distribution systems give them an enormous competitive advantage, setting up a protective moat around their economic castles.  The average company, in contrast, does battle daily without any such means of protection.  As Peter Lynch says, stocks of companies selling commodity-like products should come with a warning label: "Competition may prove hazardous to human wealth."

The competitive strengths of a Coke or Gillette are obvious to even the casual observer of business.  Yet the beta of their stocks is similar to that of a great many run-of-the-mill companies who possess little or no competitive advantage.  Should we conclude from this similarity that the competitive strength of Coke and Gillette gains them nothing when business risk is being measured?  Or should we conclude that the risk in owning a piece of a company - its stock - is somehow divorced from the long-term risk inherent in its business operations?  We believe neither conclusion makes sense and that equating beta with investment risk also makes no sense.

The theoretician bred on beta has no mechanism for differentiating the risk inherent in, say, a single-product toy company selling pet rocks or hula hoops from that of another toy company whose sole product is Monopoly or Barbie. But it's quite possible for ordinary investors to make such distinctions if they have a reasonable understanding of consumer behavior and the factors that create long-term competitive strength or weakness. Obviously, every investor will make mistakes.  But by confining himself to a relatively few, easy-to-understand cases, a reasonably intelligent, informed and diligent person can judge investment risks with a useful degree of accuracy.

In many industries, of course, Charlie and I can't determine whether we are dealing with a "pet rock" or a "Barbie."  We couldn't solve this problem, moreover, even if we were to spend years intensely studying those industries.  Sometimes our own intellectual shortcomings would stand in the way of understanding, and in other cases the nature of the industry would be the roadblock.  For example, a business that must deal with fast-moving technology is not going to lend itself to reliable evaluations of its long-term economics.  Did we foresee thirty years ago what would transpire in the television-manufacturing or computer industries?  Of course not.  (Nor did most of the investors and corporate managers who enthusiastically entered those industries.) Why, then, should Charlie and I now think we can predict the future of other rapidly-evolving businesses?  We'll stick instead with the easy cases.  Why search for a needle buried in a haystack when one is sitting in plain sight?

Of course, some investment strategies - for instance, our efforts in arbitrage over the years - require wide diversification. If significant risk exists in a single transaction, overall risk should be reduced by making that purchase one of many mutually-independent commitments.  Thus, you may consciously purchase a risky investment - one that indeed has a significant possibility of causing loss or injury - if you believe that your gain, weighted for probabilities, considerably exceeds your loss, comparably weighted, and if you can commit to a number of similar, but unrelated opportunities.  Most venture capitalists employ this strategy.  Should you choose to pursue this course, you should adopt the outlook of the casino that owns a roulette wheel, which will want to see lots of action because it is favored by probabilities, but will refuse to accept a single, huge bet.

Another situation requiring wide diversification occurs when an investor who does not understand the economics of specific businesses nevertheless believes it in his interest to be a long-term owner of American industry.  That investor should both own a large number of equities and space out his purchases.  By periodically investing in an index fund, for example, the know-nothing investor can actually out-perform most investment professionals.  Paradoxically, when "dumb" money acknowledges its limitations, it ceases to be dumb.

On the other hand, if you are a know-something investor, able to understand business economics and to find five to ten sensibly-priced companies that possess important long-term competitive advantages, conventional diversification makes no sense for you.  It is apt simply to hurt your results and increase your risk.  I cannot understand why an investor of that sort elects to put money into a business that is his 20th favorite rather than simply adding that money to his top choices - the businesses he understands best and that present the least risk, along with the greatest profit potential. In the words of the prophet Mae West:  "Too much of a good thing can be wonderful."


Warren E. Buffett
March 1, 1994

5 de junio de 2012

Aportación de la Oficina de Farmacia al Sistema Sanitario español en el periodo de 1996 a 2010

El ritmo de crecimiento del gasto sanitario público lleva a todos los gobiernos a introducir medidas correctoras para contenerlo y resolver, en parte, los problemas de la financiación sanitaria.

En el contexto español se ha optado por medidas correctoras con efectos económicos inmediatos, aplicadas sobre las Industria, la Distribución Mayorista y las Oficinas de Farmacia. La naturaleza de estas medidas ha permitido desacelerar el ritmo del crecimiento del gasto farmacéutico público, pero con un efecto limitado en el tiempo.


4 de junio de 2012

Los activos del mercado del Arte como objeto de inversión financiera.

En la presente tesis se analizan los activos del mercado internacional de arte como objetos de inversión financiera alternativa a otros activos clásicos (acciones, bienes inmuebles…), para el período 1997-2006 En primer lugar, se lleva a cabo un estudio de la evolución del mercado de arte internacional, analizando la distribución de la cifra de negocios por países y categorías artísticas.
 

A continuación, se analizan los diferentes activos que componen el mercado del arte, definiendo las características que determinan el precio de mercado de cada obra de arte. Se dedica especial atención a la variable Artista, la cual ha sido cuantificada a través de fuentes documentales y digitales, dando lugar a dos grupos de variables, Redmétricas y las Bibliométricas, analizando la influencia de éstas en el volumen de facturación del mercado del arte.
 

Posteriormente, se construye un índice del mercado internacional de arte que permita recoger los cambios experimentados en la totalidad del mercado y no en un segmento del mismo (grupo de artistas o movimiento artístico) en el pasado y en base a ellos intentar predecir la evolución del mismo, a fin de de utilizarlo conjuntamente en las decisiones de inversión con otros sectores de actividad económica, fundamentalmente los sectores bursátiles e inmobiliario.
 

Por último, tras analizar las características rentabilidad riesgo de la inversión en obras de arte frente a inversiones clásicas en acciones e inmuebles, se estudia la hipótesis de cómo un inversor clásico, que invierte en bonos, acciones y/o inmuebles consigue maximizar su rentabilidad para el mismo nivel de riesgo invirtiendo en carteras diversificadas mixtas, que combinen objetos de arte con activos de naturaleza financiera y/o inmobiliaria. Por otra parte, se quiere comprobar cómo el inversor arriesgado, aquel que invierte en arte tratará de reducir el riesgo, diversificando su inversión en acciones e inmuebles. En ambas hipótesis se lleva a cabo la aplicación del modelo de Markowitz y Tobin.



3 de junio de 2012

El crédito bancario a la construcción en España (1993-2007)


La intensa escalada de precios y del número de obras que ha experimentado el sector de la construcción en España durante los últimos años ha sido sólo la cara física o real de la burbuja inmobiliaria. Junto a ella, se ha producido simultáneamente un enorme crecimiento del crédito destinado a financiar todas estas nuevas operaciones; crédito que en su mayor medida procede del sistema bancario.
 
Existen sólo dos caminos para financiar una determinada inversión: los fondos propios y el endeudamiento. El primero consiste en que el propio inversor ahorre parte de los excedentes de sus rentas hasta que pueda sufragar el coste de la inversión, el segundo pasa por que el inversor pida prestado a otro individuo el capital que necesita para realizar la inversión. Tanto en un caso como el otro, por consiguiente, es necesario que haya un ahorro previo (ya sea propio o ajeno) para poder financiar la inversión.
 
Sin embargo, en el sistema monetario actual, basado en un dinero fiduciario de curso forzoso administrado por un banco central monopolístico, las entidades de crédito tienen un amplio margen para crear cantidades adicionales de crédito no respaldado por ahorro. Para ello tan sólo tienen que crear medios de pago presentes descontando activos cuyo valor actual recoge una perspectiva de flujos futuros de dinero.
 
En realidad se trata de una práctica deshonesta: esos fondos no deberían estar disponibles hasta que el activo proporcionara por sí mismo las proyectadas rentas futuras o hasta que un ahorrador prestara utilizando el valor del activo como colateral; en caso contrario, estamos proporcionando poder adquisitivo a quien todavía no lo ha producido, esto es, existe una necesaria descoordinación de planes en la economía.
 
El patrón oro servía como firme centinela ante estas fraudulentas veleidades. El banco central no podía descontar activos más allá de sus reservas de oro, es decir, más allá de su ahorro propio. Los procesos expansionistas eran rápidamente liquidados y las crisis, si bien drásticas, tenían una muy corta duración. 

Con el dinero fiduciario, sin embargo, la expansión crediticia se realimenta en una especie de círculo vicioso de mucha mayor duración. Los nuevos fondos afluyen al mercado bien en forma de consumo o de ahorro. Si los fondos se consumen, los flujos de caja de ciertas industrias se incrementan, de modo el valor presente de sus activos aumenta. Si los fondos afluyen al ahorro (y a la inversión), como suele ser habitual, los tipos de interés se reducen, lo que tiene dos consecuencias: primero elevando el valor actual de los activos de la economía y segundo vuelve rentables proyectos de inversión que antes no lo eran, generando una burbuja inflacionaria en ciertos activos.

En cualquier caso, el valor de los activos tiende a incrementarse, lo que a su vez sirve para que el banco central insufle mayores cantidades de fondos, dado que sus descuentos se practican contra esos activos revalorizados.
 
En el sistema financiero actual, los bancos comerciales desempeñan un papel fundamental en la transmisión de todo este proceso ya que son ellos quienes, en buena medida, proporcionan el crédito a los inversores y, sobre todo, quienes tienen acceso al banco central para seguir descontando activos. Por consiguiente, cabe esperar que sean ellos quienes concentren buena parte de los activos afectados por la burbuja financiera y quienes más sufran las consecuencias del ulterior pinchazo.

Informe

 Juan Ramón Rallo
19/05/2008

1 de junio de 2012

Mindmap Sales & Operations Planning (S&OP)


As a result of increasing volatility in demand many companies are busy implementing Sales & Operations Planning. They try to get beyond balancing forecasted demand and manufacturing volumes and incorporate financial budgets and business scenario. What should companies consider to get to a next level in S&OP? Supply chain consultancy Involvation and Supply Chain Movement created a comprehensive mindmap to give a practical overview of all the aspects to consider for improving S&OP.

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