Presentaciones del Prof. Eduardo Estay G. de la Atlantic International University

Presentación: Mercados Financieros y estrategia financiera

Presentación: Valoración de empresas

La Fageda, història d'una bogeria.

Case method: Mrs B's Story.

An American legend, Rose Blumkin (Mrs. B), knew early in life that honesty and integrity would serve her well. Those beliefs laid the foundation for Nebraska Furniture Mart's rise to its status as a Midwestern retailing legend.

Born outside of Minsk, Russia, in 1893, Rose Gorelick followed her husband, Isadore Blumkin to America in 1917 to take on the American dream. By 1922, the young couple had scraped together enough money to have her family flee Russia and join them in America.

In addition to raising their four children, Mrs. B helped with her husband's business ventures, including a second-hand clothing shop. Finding deals on men's suits and accessories, she printed 10,000 circulars that offered to outfit a man from head to toe for five dollars - an amazingly fair deal for the times. It worked nicely, and she made a respectable profit.

In 1937, the Nebraska Furniture Mart was founded in the basement of her husband's shop. Her belief in selling at tiny margins created rough going early on with the manufacturers boycotting Mrs. B at the urging of local competition, who generally operated on higher markups. Traveling by train to Kansas City, Chicago and New York, she became a proficient furniture bargain hunter by buying from large furniture stores at 5% over their cost, and still making a profit using her low markup sales strategy.

Still, battling reluctant suppliers and a depressed Korean War economy in 1951, Mrs. B filled Omaha's City Auditorium with the store's inventory for an all-out, three-day sale. In three chaotic days, she took in $250,000 and eliminated her debt forever.

The growing success led to moves to various downtown locations, and the flagship store at 2205 Farnam eventually expanded to 120,000 square feet and operated in tandem with the present 72nd street location from 1970 to 1980. Joining his mother in the business in post-war 1946, son Louie contributed immeasurably to the growth and success of the business.

A devastating tornado in 1975 caused only a minor blip on the business record of the business. With millions of dollars in damage to the 72nd street store, Mrs. B and her son simply rebuilt bigger and better.
  

Impressed with the success, business savvy and honest dealings of the Blumkins, investor Warren Buffett and Mrs. B used a simple handshake to seal the purchase of 90% of the business for Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway portfolio in 1983. The 'Historic Omaha Handshake' plus a simple two-page written agreement were all that were required - no audit of the store's books, no inventory of its merchandise.

Daily dealings with her customers over the years, long work days and later in life, her motorized cart buzzing around her store, she was always bringing a smile to a customer's face with a great deal.

Throughout the years Mrs. B supported many causes and various community events, many times behind the scenes. The most notable is the Rose Blumkin Jewish Home and the renovation of the Astro theater into 'The Rose', - the Rose Blumkin Performing Arts Center - the home of the Emmy Gifford Children's Theater.

Until her death in 1998 at 104, Rose Blumkin rode the crest of a simple business tenet: "Sell cheap and tell the truth." The store, now under the leadership of her son Louie, and three grandsons, still adheres to this advice as Mrs. B's philosophy continues to help them meet each new challenge.

Nebraska Furniture Mart

12 principios del Value Investing

Bestinver Asset Management

Nothing to fear but fear itself?

The yields on safe haven government bonds fell to a record low at the end of May. Nominal 2-year interest rates on Swiss and German sovereign debt are currently negative – people pay for the right to lend money to these governments. 10-year interest rates on bonds issued in these countries and in the US and UK are all below the expected rate of inflation over the next 10 years. Hence creditors expect to get back less in real terms than the amount they have lent their governments.

This is a symptom of extreme anxiety about the economic outlook. While dampened growth in Q1 in China, India and some other emerging markets, and generally somewhat lower activity indicators for the industrial sectors in both advanced and emerging economies, may go some way to explaining this pessimism, the main thing weighing on investors' minds is the outlook for the eurozone.

The upcoming parliamentary election in Greece has led a lot of investors to conclude that a Greek exit from the eurozone is a given. To some extent the market is also pricing in the likelihood of a complete breakdown of the eurozone, with all 17 member states reintroducing their own currencies. And that would be a calamity not just for Europe, but for the global economy as a whole.

Given that the stakes are so high, however, we think that only severe political mishandling would lead to a break-up of the eurozone. In fact, since the risk of contagion is real, we believe that Greece too will remain a member of the eurozone. Note that the electorate in Greece supports the euro by a huge majority. What Athens probably will demand, irrespective of who wins the June 17 election, is a renegotiation of the austerity package that the EU and the IMF has imposed on Greece. And we expect them to get it.

In the event of a "Grexit", we expect the ECB, the EU and the IMF to use all the ammunition they can muster in order to contain the crisis. If politicians hesitate, we expect the ECB to launch massive new rounds of long-term cheap financing of the European banking system. In addition we expect the ECB to de facto transform the monetary union into a fiscal union, by purchasing unlimited amounts of peripheral sovereign debt at certain guaranteed interest spreads relative to Germany. The ECB technocrats cannot do this without being given the green light by politicians. But we expect them to get the go-ahead, and for the politicians to then explain to their electorates and to try legally implement a fiscal union ex post.

The Economy at a Glance is a macroeconomic update by Torgeir Høien.

Skagen Fondene

Warren Buffett: "After we buy a stock, consequently, we would not be disturbed if markets closed for a year or two"

Academics, however, like to define investment "risk" differently, averring that it is the relative volatility of a stock or portfolio of stocks - that is, their volatility as compared to that of a large universe of stocks.  Employing data bases and statistical skills, these academics compute with precision the "beta" of a stock - its relative volatility in the past - and then build arcane investment and capital-allocation theories around this calculation.  In their hunger for a single statistic to measure risk, however, they forget a fundamental principle:  It is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong.

For owners of a business - and that's the way we think of shareholders - the academics' definition of risk is far off the mark, so much so that it produces absurdities.  For example, under beta-based theory, a stock that has dropped very sharply compared to the market - as had Washington Post when we bought it in 1973 - becomes "riskier" at the lower price than it was at the higher price.  Would that description have then made any sense to someone who was offered the entire company at a vastly-reduced price?

In fact, the true investor welcomes volatility.  Ben Graham explained why in Chapter 8 of The Intelligent Investor.  There he introduced "Mr. Market," an obliging fellow who shows up every day to either buy from you or sell to you, whichever you wish.  The more manic-depressive this chap is, the greater the opportunities available to the investor.  That's true because a wildly fluctuating market means that irrationally low prices will periodically be attached to solid businesses.  It is impossible to see how the availability of such prices can be thought of as increasing the hazards for an investor who is totally free to either ignore the market or exploit its folly.

In assessing risk, a beta purist will disdain examining what a company produces, what its competitors are doing, or how much borrowed money the business employs.  He may even prefer not to know the company's name.  What he treasures is the price history of its stock.  In contrast, we'll happily forgo knowing the price history and instead will seek whatever information will further our understanding of the company's business.  After we buy a stock, consequently, we would not be disturbed if markets closed for a year or two.  We don't need a daily quote on our 100% position in See's or H. H. Brown to validate our well-being.  Why, then, should we need a quote on our 7% interest in Coke?

In our opinion, the real risk that an investor must assess is whether his aggregate after-tax receipts from an investment (including those he receives on sale) will, over his prospective holding period, give him at least as much purchasing power as he had to begin with, plus a modest rate of interest on that initial stake.  Though this risk cannot be calculated with engineering precision, it can in some cases be judged with a degree of accuracy that is useful.  The primary factors bearing upon this evaluation are:

1) The certainty with which the long-term economic characteristics of the business can be evaluated;

2) The certainty with which management can be evaluated, both as to its ability to realize the full potential of the business and to wisely employ its cash flows;

3) The certainty with which management can be counted on to channel the rewards from the business to the shareholders rather than to itself;

4) The purchase price of the business;

5) The levels of taxation and inflation that will be experienced and that will determine the degree by which an investor's purchasing-power return is reduced from his gross return.

These factors will probably strike many analysts as unbearably fuzzy, since they cannot be extracted from a data base of any kind. But the difficulty of precisely quantifying these matters does not negate their importance nor is it insuperable.  Just as Justice Stewart found it impossible to formulate a test for obscenity but nevertheless asserted, "I know it when I see it," so also can investors - in an inexact but useful way - "see" the risks inherent in certain investments without reference to complex equations or price histories.

Is it really so difficult to conclude that Coca-Cola and Gillette possess far less business risk over the long term than, say, any computer company or retailer?  Worldwide, Coke sells about 44% of all soft drinks, and Gillette has more than a 60% share (in value) of the blade market.  Leaving aside chewing gum, in which Wrigley is dominant, I know of no other significant businesses in which the leading company has long enjoyed such global power.

Moreover, both Coke and Gillette have actually increased their worldwide shares of market in recent years.  The might of their brand names, the attributes of their products, and the strength of their distribution systems give them an enormous competitive advantage, setting up a protective moat around their economic castles.  The average company, in contrast, does battle daily without any such means of protection.  As Peter Lynch says, stocks of companies selling commodity-like products should come with a warning label: "Competition may prove hazardous to human wealth."

The competitive strengths of a Coke or Gillette are obvious to even the casual observer of business.  Yet the beta of their stocks is similar to that of a great many run-of-the-mill companies who possess little or no competitive advantage.  Should we conclude from this similarity that the competitive strength of Coke and Gillette gains them nothing when business risk is being measured?  Or should we conclude that the risk in owning a piece of a company - its stock - is somehow divorced from the long-term risk inherent in its business operations?  We believe neither conclusion makes sense and that equating beta with investment risk also makes no sense.

The theoretician bred on beta has no mechanism for differentiating the risk inherent in, say, a single-product toy company selling pet rocks or hula hoops from that of another toy company whose sole product is Monopoly or Barbie. But it's quite possible for ordinary investors to make such distinctions if they have a reasonable understanding of consumer behavior and the factors that create long-term competitive strength or weakness. Obviously, every investor will make mistakes.  But by confining himself to a relatively few, easy-to-understand cases, a reasonably intelligent, informed and diligent person can judge investment risks with a useful degree of accuracy.

In many industries, of course, Charlie and I can't determine whether we are dealing with a "pet rock" or a "Barbie."  We couldn't solve this problem, moreover, even if we were to spend years intensely studying those industries.  Sometimes our own intellectual shortcomings would stand in the way of understanding, and in other cases the nature of the industry would be the roadblock.  For example, a business that must deal with fast-moving technology is not going to lend itself to reliable evaluations of its long-term economics.  Did we foresee thirty years ago what would transpire in the television-manufacturing or computer industries?  Of course not.  (Nor did most of the investors and corporate managers who enthusiastically entered those industries.) Why, then, should Charlie and I now think we can predict the future of other rapidly-evolving businesses?  We'll stick instead with the easy cases.  Why search for a needle buried in a haystack when one is sitting in plain sight?

Of course, some investment strategies - for instance, our efforts in arbitrage over the years - require wide diversification. If significant risk exists in a single transaction, overall risk should be reduced by making that purchase one of many mutually-independent commitments.  Thus, you may consciously purchase a risky investment - one that indeed has a significant possibility of causing loss or injury - if you believe that your gain, weighted for probabilities, considerably exceeds your loss, comparably weighted, and if you can commit to a number of similar, but unrelated opportunities.  Most venture capitalists employ this strategy.  Should you choose to pursue this course, you should adopt the outlook of the casino that owns a roulette wheel, which will want to see lots of action because it is favored by probabilities, but will refuse to accept a single, huge bet.

Another situation requiring wide diversification occurs when an investor who does not understand the economics of specific businesses nevertheless believes it in his interest to be a long-term owner of American industry.  That investor should both own a large number of equities and space out his purchases.  By periodically investing in an index fund, for example, the know-nothing investor can actually out-perform most investment professionals.  Paradoxically, when "dumb" money acknowledges its limitations, it ceases to be dumb.

On the other hand, if you are a know-something investor, able to understand business economics and to find five to ten sensibly-priced companies that possess important long-term competitive advantages, conventional diversification makes no sense for you.  It is apt simply to hurt your results and increase your risk.  I cannot understand why an investor of that sort elects to put money into a business that is his 20th favorite rather than simply adding that money to his top choices - the businesses he understands best and that present the least risk, along with the greatest profit potential. In the words of the prophet Mae West:  "Too much of a good thing can be wonderful."

Warren E. Buffett

March 1, 1994

Aportación de la Oficina de Farmacia al Sistema Sanitario español en el periodo de 1996 a 2010

El ritmo de crecimiento del gasto sanitario público lleva a todos los gobiernos a introducir medidas correctoras para contenerlo y resolver, en parte, los problemas de la financiación sanitaria.

En el contexto español se ha optado por medidas correctoras con efectos económicos inmediatos, aplicadas sobre las Industria, la Distribución Mayorista y las Oficinas de Farmacia. La naturaleza de estas medidas ha permitido desacelerar el ritmo del crecimiento del gasto farmacéutico público, pero con un efecto limitado en el tiempo.

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Los activos del mercado del Arte como objeto de inversión financiera.

En la presente tesis se analizan los activos del mercado internacional de arte como objetos de inversión financiera alternativa a otros activos clásicos (acciones, bienes inmuebles…), para el período 1997-2006 En primer lugar, se lleva a cabo un estudio de la evolución del mercado de arte internacional, analizando la distribución de la cifra de negocios por países y categorías artísticas.
 
A continuación, se analizan los diferentes activos que componen el mercado del arte, definiendo las características que determinan el precio de mercado de cada obra de arte. Se dedica especial atención a la variable Artista, la cual ha sido cuantificada a través de fuentes documentales y digitales, dando lugar a dos grupos de variables, Redmétricas y las Bibliométricas, analizando la influencia de éstas en el volumen de facturación del mercado del arte.
 
Posteriormente, se construye un índice del mercado internacional de arte que permita recoger los cambios experimentados en la totalidad del mercado y no en un segmento del mismo (grupo de artistas o movimiento artístico) en el pasado y en base a ellos intentar predecir la evolución del mismo, a fin de de utilizarlo conjuntamente en las decisiones de inversión con otros sectores de actividad económica, fundamentalmente los sectores bursátiles e inmobiliario.
 
Por último, tras analizar las características rentabilidad riesgo de la inversión en obras de arte frente a inversiones clásicas en acciones e inmuebles, se estudia la hipótesis de cómo un inversor clásico, que invierte en bonos, acciones y/o inmuebles consigue maximizar su rentabilidad para el mismo nivel de riesgo invirtiendo en carteras diversificadas mixtas, que combinen objetos de arte con activos de naturaleza financiera y/o inmobiliaria. Por otra parte, se quiere comprobar cómo el inversor arriesgado, aquel que invierte en arte tratará de reducir el riesgo, diversificando su inversión en acciones e inmuebles. En ambas hipótesis se lleva a cabo la aplicación del modelo de Markowitz y Tobin.

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El crédito bancario a la construcción en España (1993-2007)

La intensa escalada de precios y del número de obras que ha experimentado el sector de la construcción en España durante los últimos años ha sido sólo la cara física o real de la burbuja inmobiliaria. Junto a ella, se ha producido simultáneamente un enorme crecimiento del crédito destinado a financiar todas estas nuevas operaciones; crédito que en su mayor medida procede del sistema bancario.
 

Existen sólo dos caminos para financiar una determinada inversión: los fondos propios y el endeudamiento. El primero consiste en que el propio inversor ahorre parte de los excedentes de sus rentas hasta que pueda sufragar el coste de la inversión, el segundo pasa por que el inversor pida prestado a otro individuo el capital que necesita para realizar la inversión. Tanto en un caso como el otro, por consiguiente, es necesario que haya un ahorro previo (ya sea propio o ajeno) para poder financiar la inversión.
 

Sin embargo, en el sistema monetario actual, basado en un dinero fiduciario de curso forzoso administrado por un banco central monopolístico, las entidades de crédito tienen un amplio margen para crear cantidades adicionales de crédito no respaldado por ahorro. Para ello tan sólo tienen que crear medios de pago presentes descontando activos cuyo valor actual recoge una perspectiva de flujos futuros de dinero.
 

En realidad se trata de una práctica deshonesta: esos fondos no deberían estar disponibles hasta que el activo proporcionara por sí mismo las proyectadas rentas futuras o hasta que un ahorrador prestara utilizando el valor del activo como colateral; en caso contrario, estamos proporcionando poder adquisitivo a quien todavía no lo ha producido, esto es, existe una necesaria descoordinación de planes en la economía.
 

El patrón oro servía como firme centinela ante estas fraudulentas veleidades. El banco central no podía descontar activos más allá de sus reservas de oro, es decir, más allá de su ahorro propio. Los procesos expansionistas eran rápidamente liquidados y las crisis, si bien drásticas, tenían una muy corta duración. 

Con el dinero fiduciario, sin embargo, la expansión crediticia se realimenta en una especie de círculo vicioso de mucha mayor duración. Los nuevos fondos afluyen al mercado bien en forma de consumo o de ahorro. Si los fondos se consumen, los flujos de caja de ciertas industrias se incrementan, de modo el valor presente de sus activos aumenta. Si los fondos afluyen al ahorro (y a la inversión), como suele ser habitual, los tipos de interés se reducen, lo que tiene dos consecuencias: primero elevando el valor actual de los activos de la economía y segundo vuelve rentables proyectos de inversión que antes no lo eran, generando una burbuja inflacionaria en ciertos activos.

En cualquier caso, el valor de los activos tiende a incrementarse, lo que a su vez sirve para que el banco central insufle mayores cantidades de fondos, dado que sus descuentos se practican contra esos activos revalorizados.
 

En el sistema financiero actual, los bancos comerciales desempeñan un papel fundamental en la transmisión de todo este proceso ya que son ellos quienes, en buena medida, proporcionan el crédito a los inversores y, sobre todo, quienes tienen acceso al banco central para seguir descontando activos. Por consiguiente, cabe esperar que sean ellos quienes concentren buena parte de los activos afectados por la burbuja financiera y quienes más sufran las consecuencias del ulterior pinchazo.

Informe

 Juan Ramón Rallo
19/05/2008

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